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Draft Recommendation
on space systemsfor Europe: observution, communictfiions and navigotion satellites 
-
reply to the annual report of the Council
The Assembly.
(i) Considering the need for Europe to acquire its own satellite systems with a view to developing
the emerging European satellite industries and enhancing their competitiveness;
(i, Noting that it is particularly important to fulfil that need in the field of space-based observation,
in order to increase Europe's decision-making autonomy:
(ii, Considering that in the communications sector Europe must also acquire the necessary means
for managing information warfare, given that communications satellites can be used for the coordination
of forces. which is essential for any military operation particularly one conducted b1' a coalition of
states:
(iv) Bearing in mind that in the navigation field, Europe is involved in the Global Navigation
Satellite System programme (GNSS), which represents a political and industrial challenge and will
provide European military and civilian users with a reliable, efficient and very high-precision
positioning system;
O Recalling that WEU must pursue the task given to it by the Council of Ministers of evaluating
the possibilities for its participation in a developing multilateral European programme;
(vil Stressing that WEU must- in this respect. take into account the industrial mergers currently
under way and the new prografirmes arising out of them, as rvell as its own interests, rvhich should
induce it to participate in a satellite programme in rvhich it has access to the programming of the
satellite;
(vir) Noting that the Space Group is conducting a feasibility study on the direct reception of satellite
images;
(viiil Welcoming the work of the Satellite Centre both in general and, more specifically at the present
time, in connection lvith the events in Kosovo;
(ix) Welcoming in addition the ongoing development of technologies and procedures that will
enhance the performance of the Satellite Centre (efforts to reduce image acquisition time, new analytical
tools etc.) despite budgetary constraints:
(x) Taking the vielv that the Satellite Centre has a major role to play both for defining European
requirernents and rvith regard to the acquisition. centralisation and analysis ofsatellite data;
(xi) Recalling that Europe is fully competitive from the industrial and technological points of vielv,
all the more so in light of the current industrial mergers;
(xii) Emphasising the importance of striving for interoperabiliW of satellite systems;
(xiii) Deeming that Russia's experience in the space sector constitutes an important asset in terms of
European know-how;
(xiv) Noting that there is real resolve in Europe to acquire efficient satellite systems,
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RECOMMENDS THAT THE COI.JNCIL
l. Consider the central, coordinating role of WEU in the European military space sector
(observation, communications and navigation), taking into account the following factors:
the need for an autonomous European capacity for decision-muking;
industrial mergers in Europe:
the importance the space sector has acquired in Europe:
the importance of having Europe's operational needs defined by WEU- a political entity:
the involvement of WEU in European satellite programmes:
the quest for interoperability;
the need to take due account of Russian expertise:
the need in Europe for an institution to manage satellite data;
2. Assist the Satellite Centre, bearing those requirements in mind, in its development and its efforts
to reduce satellite data acquisition times. taking due account of the following factors:
participation of WEU in a developing European observation satellite prograrnme r,vhich gives
the Satellite Centre access to the programming of a satellite, in accordance with its
requirements;
procurement of a system for the direct reception of images, which is a necessary factor in
reducing acquisition times;
3. Enable the Satellite Centre to become a body responsible for centralising European skills and
know-horv in the field of space-based earth observation, by virtue of the experience it has acquired in
the follorving fields:
European cooperation;
meetings rvith representatives of industry for the presentation of their progr.mlmes:
collection of images;
analysis of satellite data;
training of analysts;
development of analytical software, databases and geographic information systems (GIS).
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr D[az de Mera, Rapporteur)
I. Introduaion
l. The purpose of this report is to reaffirm
the need for European systems:
- 
to develop and enhance the competi-
tiveness of the emerging European sat-
ellite industries:
to increase Europe's decision-making
autonomy in the field of space-based
observation;
- 
to respond to the crucial need in the
communications field for Europe to ac-
quire the means of managing informa-
tion warfare. Communications satellites
can be used to coordinate forces, a cru-
cial factor in any military mission con-
ducted by a coalition of states;
to acquire a European positioning sys-
tem (GNSS programme) providing
both civilian and military users with
access to a reliable and efficient high-
precision system. Europe must rise to
this challenge which is both political
(the American GPS system, to date,
being a dual-precision system) and in-
dustrial in nature.
2. WEU must take account of:
ongoing industrial mergers and the new
programmes arising out ofthem;
its own interests, requiring it to achieve
access to satellite images by participat-
ing in a European space-based obser-
vation programme, rather than by sim-
ply purchasing images, as it does at
present. With a view to reducing ac-
quisition times and enhancing quality,
when considering participation in any
satellite programme, WEU must think
in terms of access to the programming
of the satellite.
3. This report defines the categories of sat-
ellite systems currently available in Europe, rvith
a vierv to WEU's becoming involved, in the near
future, as a fully-fledged parfrrer in those systems
which it considers rvill best serve the develop-
ment of a European Security and Defence Iden-
tity.
4. WEU must act as a central, organising
body with an interest in the industrial mergers
currently under way in Europe. To do so, it must.
like ESA- state its requirements and assert itself
as a potential customer.
5. The essential purpose of observation sat-
ellites is to provide information. However, the
most valuable information is worthless unless it
is analysed and disseminated at the right moment.
Information these days is disseminated by means
of sophisticated communications tools, including
satellites. That is lvhy it is important for WEU to
keep abreast of European studies in the field of
communications satellites.
6. Reference will also be made to Europe's
progress in the field of navigation satellites and
to the advantages for Europe of developing such
a system.
II. WEU's space activities
I. Aaivities of the Space Group
7. On 18 November 1998 the Council of
Ministers of WEU, meeting in Erfrrrt, called on
the Permanent Council to actively pursue the
task, agreed in Madrid in November 1995 and
reaffirmed in Ostend in November 1996- of eval-
uating the possibilities for WEU participation in
a developing multilateral European programme.
The Space Group submiued a progress report on
the subject to the Council of Ministers at its
meeting in Rhodes. It was indicated in the con-
clusion of that report that before any recom-
mendations could be submitted to the ministers,
the advantages for WEU of more direct access to
satellite imagery needed to be balanced against
other considerations, such as the Organisation's
operational requirements and the cost of provid-
ing such access.
8. Furthermore, the Space Group is currently
engaged in a feasibility study on a system for the
direct reception of satellite images.
2. The Sotellite Centre
9. The Satellite Centre operates with an an-
nual budget of some €8.7 million (30% of the
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WEU budget). It analyses satellite information to
provide answers to questions put to it by the
Council. It trains satellite image analysts and
provides interpretations of satellite imagery to
international organisations and WEU countries.
It carries out general surveillance of European
zones of interest and makes a contribution to the
process of verification of arms control and dis-
armament treaties. ln parallel, it provides support
for Petersberg missions. And finally, as part of
its crisis-prevention mission, it is engaged in en-
vironmental monitoringr .
10. The Centre's Research Division is working
on the development of new tools for analysts de-
signed to meet the operational needs of the
Centre and compatible with existing interfaces.
These include, inter alia:
- data integration systems;
- systems for the complementarity and
merging of data (e.g. of optical and
radar images): PAIRS (Professional
Automatic lmage Registration System);
- support tools for automatic analyses:
AIMI (Automatic Interpretation of
Multispectral Images);
- 
geographic information systems (GIS).
11. It is continually upgrading its technology
and procedures in order to improve its perform-
ance. For operations in Kosovo it can supply
precise analyses in less than four days. Horvever,
its scope is currently limited by the fact that it is
not involved in the programming of the satellites
on which it relies for its images. lmages are cur-
rently purchased from a number of suppliers in-
cluding: Spot lmage (France), Landsat (US),
IRS-IC and IRS-ID (India), Radarsat (Canada),
ERS-I and ERS-2 (Europe), KVR (Russia),
Helios-l (France, Italy and Spain).
12. ln view of its budgetary constraints, the
Satellite Centre must acquire images u'hich give
good value for money. Helios-l images, for ex-
ample (FF 200 000 per image), may seem ex-
pensive, but they offer guaranteed quality of im-
aging performance.
13. The drawback of this system of purchas-
ing images is that the Centre is unable to partici-
' S.-. epp"ndix t: The WEU Satellite Centre:
missions and mode of operation.
pate in programming the satellites. The Satellite
Centre is currently studying future satellite ob-
servation systems with a view to identifying the
ones which will provide the images best suited to
its requirements (for example, in terms of the
cost and the possibility of progranrmlng the sys-
tem). Commercial high-resolution imaging sys-
tems currently under development (cf. Chapter
lll.4(b) Political situation: United States) are
financially attractive for the Centre. However,
the quality of those images must be fully reliable
if Europe is to retain its autonomous capacity for
analysis.
14. The possibility of purchasing commercial
high-resolution satellite images will, for obvious
reasons of cost, be highly advantageous for the
Satellite Centre, provided that the quality of the
images supplied is totally reliable. The Centre is
tr"ving to reduce the time needed to access images
(study of possible participation in a developing
European multrlateral progrzunme, testing of a
mobile data-receiver station). It is currently in the
process of looking into the different solutions
available to it in the field of imagery, in order to
further upgrade its performance. To reduce im-
age acquisition times, access to satellite images
must be improved. The observation programmes
presented in this report, with the exception of
SAR Lupe, are open to participation by WEU
and offer a choice of at least three options:
participation by WEU as a fully-
fledged partner in a cooperation pro-
gr,unme;
contribution by WEU to operational
costs in exchange for an appropriate
percentage of the system's resources,
signature by WEU of a memorandum
ofunderstanding granting it a preferen-
tial customer status on a commercial
basis.
III. Current situation in thefield of satellites
1. A newworld space order
15. Space is the focus for tomorrow's tech-
nologies. lncreasinglv, these technologies are
being geared tolvards the civilian sector
(scientific programmes and general commercial
applications), leading to the emergence of satel-
lite constellations dedicated to all forms of com-
6
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munications (TV, the Internet, telephony etc.)
High-resolution imaging has so far been confined
to the military sector, but already commercial
projects are emerging for the supply of high-
resolution images (l metre resolution optical and
radar images, hyperspectral images etc.). The
commercial development of a sector hitherto re-
served for military customers does, of course,
raise numerous questions (regarding, for ex-
ample, whether there really is a market for such
images).
16. ln Europe, a considerable number of pro-
grammes are being developed, more or less in
competition with each other, and in parallel to
that a process of consolidation is under way in
the industries concerned.
2. Technical developments: different systems
17. There is a growing trend towards clusters
of small satellites rvhich provide redundancy in
the case of failure of one ofthe satellites, entail
lower production costs and allow combined use
of several types of sensor (one satellite may be
equipped with optical sflisors, another with radar
sensors, for instance).
18. The satellite field is an area in which
Europe is competitive. Given the dual-use nature
of several space-related technologies, a consor-
tium's involvement in a military satellite pro-
grarnme may give it a competitive edge in the
field of commercial (scientific earth observation,
communications, positioning) and/or military
satellites.
3. Industrial mergers in Europe
19. Europe's satellite industry is composed of
two groups. each of which plays a major role at
international level:
firstly, the European group resulting
from the merger of Daimler-Chrysler
Aerospace (DASA) and Matra Mar-
coni Space (GEC: 49%o; Lagarddre:
5l%). This group, which is the world's
third satellite group behind Lockheed
and Hughes, is responsible for the pro-
grarrmes known. before the merger, as
TerraSAR EagleEye and Bimilsatcom.
Dornier's subsidiary Daimler-Chrysler
Aerospace is currently competing
against OHB-System GmbH for the
German SAR Lupe project. Alenia
Spazio could join this group in a few
months'time;
secondly, Alcatel Space, resulting from
the merger. among others, of Alcatel
Espace, Aerospatiale Satellites- Sextant
Avionique and Thomson CSF- which
ranks fourth at international level in the
satellite field. Alcatel Space is cur-
rently working on Helios-2.
20. The mergers which gave birth to these hvo
industrial giants took place recently. When re-
ferring to the progrcmmes dating from pre-
merger days it is difficult not to imagine that
some of them may be abandoned in favour of
others.
4. Political situation
(a) Europe
21. WEU's long-term objective of becoming
involved in a European programme may be ad-
vantageous for Europe for at least three reasons:
it will bring about further progress to-
llards a European space defence policy
through WEU (following Helios-l and
the creation of the Satellite Centre):
it will involve participation in the de-
velopment and pooling of industrial re-
sources in the satellite field (since
WEU promotes the setting-up of joint
or complementary programmes in Eur-
ope);
it will encourage the development of
interoperable systems (in the field of
communications satellites).
22. The Saint Malo Franco-British Summit
was a watershed in the field of European defence.
Nelv opportunities for satellite programmes have
emerged following Mr Blair's initiative. "Europe
needs strengthened armed forces that can react
rapidly to the new risks- and which are supported
by a strong and competitive European defence
industry and technologf". Mergers between
European defence companies will lead, de facto,
to the development of truly European industrial
programmes.
23. A possibility for WEU would be to par-
ticipate in a European prograrnme geared to co-
' Suir,-t t tulo Declaration, 4 December 1998.
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operation, among others, with Japan and the
United States, for reasons of interoperability.
Furthermore. it seems essential to cooperate with
Russia in the satellite field. Russian space know-
how is an important asset for Europe.
(b) United States
24. US policl, on space, and satellites in par-
ticular, seems to be very aggressive. A knolv-
ledge of this policy rvill help us understand the
challenges we face in the satellite field.
25. It has to be admitted that the United
States, given the history of its space activities.
enjoys a considerable lead. formerly in the field
of military and now in that of both military and
civilian satellites. Efforts are in progress to de-
fine standards for the future, with a yierv to
achieving interoperability among the major allied
powers. The United States is keen to assert its
leadership in the space and satellite sectot', as
can be seen from various official declarations
and in the rvay its space-related sector is organ-
ised. Directive PDD-23 of August 1994, con-
cerning the authorisation of the commercial sale
of high-resolution images, is a good example.
The American approach has an influence on the
policy of other European countries as regards
high-resolution satellite imagery. Germany, for
instance, seems to be following in the Americans'
footsteps by developing observation satellites
which could supply images abroad. Dornier
Satellitensysteme GmbH (DASA), for example,
will be supplyrng an $80 million 500 kg satellite
with a resolution of 2 metres to Taiwan, provided
that the deal is approved by the German Gov-
ernment. This approach is conducive to the de-
velopment of observation satellite systems- since
it offers the prospect of a retum on investments.
France appears to be reticent about disseminating
its high-resolution images (problem of digitilising
terrain for cruise missiles). One solution, which
the United States will certainly adopt, would be
to control the sale of images and sensing equip-
ment.
26. Directive PDD-23 will doubtless enable
the United States to overrun the market for high-
resolution satellite i-ag"ry. Thus it lvill control
r-SE-Xrvier Pasco, Fondation de Recherche
Stratdgi qu e. "Changement de politique. changernent
de perception" (Change ofpolicy, change ofpercep-
tion).
that market and the risk of competing satellite
companies emerging will be reduced. We must
emphasise the state ofdependency engendered by
this 'all-American' approach 
- 
will the images be
reliable, for example? Several progftunmes are
currently being developed in the United States for
the supply of high-resolution images (Ikonos
from Space Imaging, Early Bird and Quick Bird
from Earthwatch, Orbview from Orbimage). The
American objective is clear: if these projects
come about, they may constitute a serious threat
to an independent capability not only for Europe,
but for the rest of the world.
27. The creation of the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (NIMAf in October 1996 is
another development, following the directive,
which illustrates the American Government's
support for private prograrnmes for the supply of
satellite imagery. The aim'of this imagrng agency
is to centralise orders for and deliveries to cus-
tomers using the various sources that are avail-
able (national and foreign, public and private).
What this means, at the end of the day, is that
NIMA and its principal shareholder 
- 
the Ameri-
can State 
- 
support and control the satellite im-
agery market. The creation of NIMA is an ex-
ample of the 'global information dominance"
that the United States authorities are establishing.
NIMA is a body capable of providing financial
support to private satellite programmes. tt is in
itself a source of funding for private American
projects through t}re contracts it awards. It coop-
erates with private suppliers of high-resolution
images, not only on setting up the mqurs of im-
age acqusition, but also on the development of
softivare and interfaces to simpliff the use of
satellite data. By facilitating access to the inter-
pretation of satellite images. the United States is
preparing to conquer new markets. lndeed, the
creation of facilities for the processing, analysis
and dissemination of satellite data will be con-
ducive to exports of those data.
28. It seems essential to study the possibility
of developing a European system equivalent to
NIMA in order to coordinate all European ac-
tivities in the field of satellite imagery. The recent
EUCOSAT report on "The end of European
satellite-based earth observation?" published in
r See Xurrier Pasco. Fondation de Recherche Stra-
tdgique, National Imagery and Mapping Agency 
-
NIMA.
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March 1999 stresses the need for a European
body similar to NIMAS.
29. According to EUCOSAT. such a body
should carn, out missions in the field of securit_v
(crisis prevention and management, verification
of international agreements. surveillance of pro-
liferation), the environment (prevention and man-
agement of natural and industrial disasters. veri-
fication of environmcntal agreements) and the
management of land and resources.
30. These different tasks are already being
carried out by' the WEU Satellite Centre. lt is
interesting to note that, thanks to current devel-
opments. the Centre is in the process of establish-
ing a good position for itself as a future coordi-
nation body'. As we have seen- it liaises rvith its
users and suppliers, analyses satellite data. op-
timises its operations (study of possible acquisi-
tion of Helios images through a mobile receiver
station- optimisation of the ground segment) and
is developing tools for optimising the merger,
analysis and dissemination of satellite data.
31. The Satellite Centre trains image anah'sts
from WEU member countries. It works on se-
curity and defence-related issues and questions of
general interest (studies on the effects of Hurri-
cane Mitch- pollution of the Dofrana region etc.).
32. NIMA's essential function is to coordinate
the requirements of the different American bodies
that use satellite imagery. It manages the pur-
chasing and archiving of imagery in order to
avoid duplication. Duplication can be avoided in
Europe by organising coordination at European
level through the WEU Satellite Centre. If a
completely nerv European institution lvere to be
set up for the management of satellite images
without building on the Satellite Centre. this
would actually amount to duplicating existing
structures!
33. Indeed- the WEU Satellite Centre has not
only the requisite experience, but also necessary
management. analytical and training skills in the
field of satellite-based observation. Moreover, we
must once again stress that as far as the public at
large is concerned, not much is kno*n about the
iS.. app.ndix I: Presentation of the EUCOSAT
report by Jean-Pierre Fourrd. former Vice-President
of the French National Assembly and former Vice-
President of the Assemblv of WEU.
commercial market for high-resolution satellite
imagery.
34. As regards GPS- the United States decided
in 1996. through the National Economic Council.
to abandon its dual-precision svstem (i.e. rvhere
the degree of precision depends on u,hether the
svstem is used for military or civilian purposes)
bt' 2006. Indeed. there are major commercial
outlets for the GPS technology, in particular in
the field of vehicle navigation sy'stems. The aim
of this l1ew measure, rvhich rvas imposed on the
Pentagon. is to challenge the European satellite
positioning sy'stem (EGNOS) r,vhich rvill soon be
on the market. If the American GPS system is no
longer a dual-precision sy'stem, European satel-
lites will have less reason to exist. except as a
tool for checking the integrity of GPS data.
5. Funding of programmes
35. Europe, it has to be admitted- does not yet
possess a satellite capability' on a par lvith that of
the United States. This shortfall can be explained
b1' the high cost of developing satellite pro-
grammes. The United States has the political lvill
to engage in this activitl,. w-hich is lvhy it invests
an annual €11.4 billion in the military space
sector- 30 times more than the €0.4 billion in-
vested by France.
36. Indeed, the development of military satel-
lite systems calls for firm political resolve and a
sound funding capability. There is a grolving
desire in Europe to develop such programmes.
The UK. France. Italy and Spain have all devel-
oped a military satellite sector. Their ranks have
now been joined by Germany- through its par-
ticipation in the development of European cap-
abilities in the field of observation (for radar
systems) and communications (Bimilsatcom).
The technical capability already esists, but there
is no coordinated approach to satellite issues. A
rvhole range of satellite prograrnmes are under
development, as we shall see belorv, and indeed
there is a case for suggesting that there may be
too man,. The fact that there are so man1, is
certainlv proof that Europe nolv has the political
resolve to acquire a high-perfornance satellite
system (including not only the satellites them-
selves but also the requisite industrial capacit_v).
That is a step forward as compared lr.ith the
situation ten years ago.
37. Horvever. the problem of programme
funding- r,vhich lve will consider in greater depth
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belolv, remains. lndeed, although the price of
satellite sl,stems has gone dorm as a result of
miniaturisation and technological progress- space
remains a costl)' business. There are trvo solu-
tions for Europe:
(a) Cooperation
38. Quite naturally- collaborative programmes
at European level are envisaged as a way of
making the cost of systems affordable and
avoiding a fragmentation, among other things- of
the research and development effort among a
number of similar programmes. The industrial
mergers that have taken place in Europe are con-
ducive to multilateral cooperation.
(b) Private fimding
39. In the framelvork of private funding
schemes like the UK's Private Financial Initia-
tive- governments pay industry for a service. The
UK's Skyret system is run on a commercial ba-
sis. This works for communications satellites, for
rvhich there is a civilian market. Moreover, it is a
safe market for companies- in that it guarantees a
return on their research and development. As
regards observation systems, holvever, there is no
proven market for high-resolution satellite im-
ages, lvhich means that the cost of the satellite
has to be borne by states and companies. One
cannot expect any significant return on invest-
ment, since the system would not normally be
sold to private customers. The commercial sys-
tems set up by the Americans are only possible
because the companies concerned have long since
fully mastered observation technologies and be-
cause the US Government has the determination
to make commercial use of its technological lead
(NIMA). The financial risks for the US compa-
nies concerned are minimal (oflthe-shelf sys-
tems, the fact that NIMA as a government
agency is a solvent customer- etc.).
IV. Which projects in Europe?
A. Observation satellites
1. The role ofobservation sotelliles
40. Observation satellites are used, inter alia,
for:
envi ronmental monitoring ;
monitoring of potential crisis areas;
anticipation of crises:
planning of operations;
monitoring the implementation of trea-
ties.
2. Types of obsemation sutellites
41. There are radar and/or optical program-
mes. using one or several satellites. Some pro-
grammes are exclusively militarl,- while others
are designed for both military and civilian appli-
cations.
42. Let us recall that while optical satellites
offer good image definition (Helios-2 rvill have
resolution of less than one metre), they are at the
mercy of the rveather, in other rvords, of cloud
cover. Conversely, radar sensors can pierce the
cloud layer and also distinguish among different
materials (microwave radiometry reveals con-
trast6), making them more effective than optical
s),stems despite resolution that is often lolver.
43. The most recent programmes are less
costly than those of a decade ago, because they
are based on satellite platforms lvhich can be
produced in small series and then adapted to
specific palloads (varied nature of space activi-
ties).
44. In parallel, there is a trend in industry. for
obvious reasons of cost, torvards clusters of
mini-satellites lr,hich can be produced in small
series, are lighter and provide redundancy should
one satellite fail.
3. hogrammes
(a) Military optical programme based on the
Helios-2 hecwy satellite
45. The Franco-German Horus programme
has been abandoned. Helios-2 is under develop-
ment by France and Spain (Matra Marconi and
Alcatel Space).
46. France takes the view that the satellite
sector is essential for Europe. During the opera-
tion launched in l99l against Iraq by the USled
coalition of allies, the Europeans often com-
plained about being "blind and deaf'. Since then
-t 
s.. urti"le by Isabelle SourbBs and Bernard
Cervelle on "The role of civil satellites in the verif-
ication of disarmament agreements", Za Vie des
Sciences, Contptes rendus. General Series. Volume
8, 1991. No. I. page 31.
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they have acquired Helios, which gives them a
degree of autonomy in their assessment of devel-
opments, for example in Kosovo. However, He-
lios does not put European capabilities on a par
with those of the Americans. Hence Helios-2,
with an estimated lifetime of l0 years, is due to
come on stream n2003.
47. Helios-2 is an optical satellite progftrrnme
with resolution which will certainly be less than
one metre (an estimated 50 cm) and for the mo-
ment it is funded by the French Govemment.
Spain has a 3%o to 6% participation in the total
budget (approximately 75 million euros, includ-
ing the ground station). 2.5%o to 3% is the
threshold for any worthwhile participation in He-
lios-2, since at that level a daily average of three
to four images can be acquired. This threshold is
somelvhat high, since Belgium is willing to con-
tribute to a European prograrnme but cannot for
the moment exceed l% (roughly one image a
dav).
4E. The design of Helios-2 seems at first sight
to be less attractive than that of other pro-
grammes presented further on in this report. In-
deed. the prografirme is based on a single heavy
satellite (some 2 500 kg), while competitors are
moving tolvards small clusters of lightlveight
satellites. Helios-2 olves its large size to the nu-
merous improvements it offers compared to the
first generation of satellites (Helios-lA and lB,
scheduled for launch in November 1999), such as
the hvo telescopes it will carry in order to in-
crease the number of frames and an infrared
channel. Moreover, in addition to its considerably
enhanced resolution, it will offer an optimised
image acquisition and processing systern in order
to reduce lead times.
(b) The CNES programme: 3S-Spot follow-on
system
49. The Spot family of satellites was devel-
oped by France's Centre National d'Etudes
Spatiales (CNES). Spot is a commercial obser-
vation satellite prograrnme (the equivalent of
Landsat in the US). The latest satellite, Spot4,
was launched on 23 March 1999. CNES is cur-
rently rvorking on the next generations, Spot-5
and 35 (Spot follow-on). The ground resolution
of Spot-5 will be some 4 metres in panchromatic
mode and l0 metres in multispectral mode. It is
due to be launched in late 2001 or early 2002.
While Spot-5 will offer much higher resolution
than Spot4. it will still not be sufficient for a
precise analysis of materials, in the case of ve-
hicles, for example.
50. The 35 satellite will certainly be of con-
siderable interest to the Satellite Centre, since it
will be the first new-generation satellite devel-
oped by CNES to have been designed to be less
costly. A 3S satellite will cost approximately €30
million (compared to some €400 million for a
Spot-l or Spot-5 satellite). Two 35 satellites
would offer an equivalent performance to that of
one Spot-5 satellite. The mass of a 35 satellite
will be only 500 kg, against 2 500 kg for a Spot-
4 or Spot-5 satellite. The first 35 launch is
scheduled for 2003.
(c) Germany and the United Kingdom: Terra-
S,4R
51, The TerraSAR programme is being devel-
oped by Matra Marconi Space UK and Dornier
Satellitensysteme GmbH (DASA). TerraSAR
(SAR: synthetic aperture radar) is a sun-syn-
chronous satellite orbiting at an altitude of 600
km. The prime contractors estimate its life span
at five years. Its maximum resolution will be 1.5
metres and its launch is scheduled for 2004. The
Satellite Centre would be a major client for the
TerraSAR programme. Hence MMS and DASA
are contemplating setting up a ground station in
the Satellite Centre for direct reception of data,
as lvell as a high bit-rate connection between the
Centre and the TerraSAR HQ in Spitzberg, in
order to provide redundancy in the suppll, of im-
ages and rapid access to archives. TerraSAR
could not be programmed by the Centre, which
means that in exchange for its investment in the
progftunme, it will receive a service. It could
nonetheless be one of this programme's most
important customers.
(d) Itallt: programme based on a cluster of
mi xe d o p ti c a l/ r a da r s a t e I I i t e s'. SIEMe d,/C O SMO
52. The SkyMed/COSMO (Constellation of
small satellites for Mediterranean basin observa-
tion) programme is composed of three optical
and four radar-sensing satellites and funded by
the Italian Space Agurcy (ASI). Finmeccanica's
subsidiary Alenia Aerospazio is the prime con-
tractor.
53. Each satellite in the constellation will have
a mass of some 600 kg. The orbit will be sun-
synchronous (480 km altitude for radar satellites,
ll
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500 km for optical satellites). The maximum
resolution of the optical component will be 2.5
metres. According to ASI, the high-resolution
radar images provided by SkyMed/COSMO
would be an excellent complement to the optical
images from Helios, The estimated cost of the
programme is about €565 million for ASI. The
first satellite is due to be launched in 2003 and
the constellation should be operationalby 2004.
54. Thus SkyMed/COSMO is particularly
noteworthy for the performance of its radar com-
ponent. Inded Alenia is currently working on
the development of the SAR-2000 radar to be
flown on four of the satellites in the constellation.
It should offer metric resolution, making it a very
effective tool for the Satellite Centre Ers a com-
plement to the high optical resolution of Helios.
ASI is exploring the possibilrt_v of collaboration
with Germany for the development of SAR-2000,
given the similarities it bears with the latter's
SAR Lupe project.
55. Italian officials are seeking parbrers in
Europe. As we have seen, SkyMed/COSMO's
radar component would be complementary to the
Helios optical satellites. Cooperation with France
on SkyMed/COSMO would certainlv be useful.
Indee4 with the Helios optical systems and the
SkyMed/COSMO radar systems, all the ad-
vanced satellite imaglng technologies lvould be
available in Europe. Spain and Greece have
shown an interest in this programme, but do not
seem for the moment to be contemplating finan-
cial participation.
56. It was envisaged from the beginning of the
SkyMed/COSMO programme to open it up to
other European parfirers. Each partner lvould ex-
ercise independent management. The constel-
lation system would give each party in posses-
sion of a receiver station direct access to images.
57. As far as potential customers for S(v-
Med/COSMO are concerned, Italian officials are
realistic. pointing out that there is no proven
market for this tlpe of earth observation pro-
gramme' which is destined essentially for gov-
ernment administrations.
7 S." f*op.an Union report on the applications of
SlcyMed/COSMO.
(e) Future national programmes
(i) Germany
58. EagleEye is a high-resolution optical sen-
sor programme developed by Dornier Satelliten-
systeme GmbH (a DASA subsidiary). It lvill of-
fer resolution of about 1.5 metres from an alti-
tude of approximately 500 lan. It developed di-
rectly out of DLR's VHRC (Very High-Resolu-
tion Camera) programme designed for the Mars
96 mission. It lvill become operational in 2002
and lvill certainly be florvn on some of the satel-
Iites of the RapidEye programme described be-
low.
59. The prime contractor for the RapidEye
progranrme is Kayser Threde CrmbH. RapidEye
AG, a legal entity in its own right, has been set
up to promote this programme. Like Sky-
Med/COSMO- it involves a constellation of
small satellites (8-10 satellites with a mass of
less than 500 kg) which communicate with each
other so that each is able, at any moment. to re-
ceive images from any of the other satellites and
relay them to tle nearest ground station without
having to rvait for the satellite to pass over tlre
ground station (ring concept). For the moment
there has been no firm decision concerning the
sensors to be flown on the RapidEye satellites.
Some ofthem will certainly be EagleEye sensors,
although no precise information is as yet avail-
able. However, whether or not this is tle case,
RapidEye should not offer resolution of less than
approximately 5 to E metres.
60. The German Defence Ministry has isued
an invitation to tender for a small radar satellite
programme called SAR Lupe. The SAR Lupe
study project is not for the moment open to other
countries. The German Govemment will contact
foreign firms once the results of the study are
available (end 1999). The aim of the study is to
prove that the new satellite technologies (small,
series-produced satellite platforms) make for
considerable savings as compared, for example,
rvith the estimated cost of the Horus progrzunme
based on a large, customised platform. The two
German companies carrying out the SAR Lupe
study are Dornier Satellitensysteme GmbH
(DASA) and OHB-System GmbH.
(ii) Spain
61. The ISHTAR programme developed by
the Spanish Space Agency (INTA) uses the plat-
t2
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form developed for MINISAT 01. ISHTAR is
defined as an optical satellite programme dedi-
cated to defence missions in a national and inter-
national framework. The satellites will have an
approximate mass of 450 kg. ISHTAR will fly in
sun-synchronous orbit at an altitude of 500 km.
The sensors installed on the satellites will pick up
optical images with metric resolution and infra-
red images with a resolution of l0 metres. Ac-
cess to ISFIIAR images will be available in a
moiimum of 12 hours. According to INTA, the
system should be operational in 2003 and cost
less than €95 million.
fl ESA: the desire to coordinate European
civi l-ni li t ary programme s
62. In the framework of its Earth Observation
Envelope Programme (EOEP: €1330 million for
the period 1999-2003), ESA will be promoting a
satellite platform (Earthwatch, essentially a
commercial project) w'hich will certainly also be
able to fly military payloads.
k) NAro
63. Use of images and analyses provided by
the Americans (from the Ke-vhole and Lacrosse
satellites).
4. Which partnerships can be envisaged in Europe?
64. There is a possibility of agreernent be-
trveen France and Italy on the SkyMed/COSMO
programme. The advantages of this programme
are its modularity and radar capability. [t could
therefore function initially in a radar configura-
tion. thanks to its complementarity with the
Helios-2 system that has already been developed
by France. The radar technologies developed by
Germany (TerraSAR and SAR Lupe) could be
used on SkyMed. The Italian Government intends
to allocate considerable funds to the development
of this progftunme.
B. Commu nicaliott s satellites
1. The role of communicdions sdellites
65. The role of communications satellites is to
provide forces with communications (data. con-
versations) that are secure (protection against
jamming). It might be useful to jointly develop a
militar), communications satellite in order to en-
sure interoperability of communications systems
during a joint operation.
2. hogrammes
(o) Bimilsatcom, a Fronco-German progrdmme
66. The Bimilsatcom programme involves Al-
catel, Thomson CSF, MMS and DASA. This
Franco-German prografirme is the follow-up to
Trimilsatcom. in which the United Kingdom was
also a participant. The UK abandoned Trimilsat-
com because ofits need to acquire an operational
system of communications satellites before the
end of the current Shnet system. lndeed, the first
of the five or six satellites in the European pro-
gramme lvould not be launched until 2005, which
\,vas not soon enough for London. Bimilsatcom is
composed of geostationary satellites lvhich will
give Europe global coverage in the field of mili-
tary communications. The cost of the pro-
gramme, including the ground stations, is esti-
mated at €2 billion.
(b) National programmes
(i) United Kingdom
67. A Skynet follow-up system must be found
(since the UK withdrew from Trimilsatcom):
MMS UK and Lockheed Martir/Alcatel are com-
petitors and will each be proposing a Skynet-5
progmmme.
(ii) haly
68. SICRAL (Satellite Italiano per Comuni-
cazione Riservate): Italy has made a major fin-
ancial investrnent in the design and development
of this progranrme, consisting of a space segment
with one operating and one back-up multifre-
quency satellite, (VHF, SMF and EHF lvave-
bands) in geostationary orbit, and a ground seg-
ment comprising the satellite's TT&C and fixed
and mobile communication terminals. The satel-
lite lveighs a total of 2.5 tonnes at launch and can
carry a payload of 330 kg. Finally, SICRAL is
interoperable rvith the NATO IV, Fltsatcom,
DSCS and Skynet systems and most of the chan-
nels of the Syracuse and Hispasat systems.
(iii) Spain
69. Hispasat: This telecommunications satel-
lite serves the Spanish programme Ccom Sat.
Hispasat lA (1992) and lB (1993) rvere built by
MMS and Hispasat lC by Alcatel. The invitation
to tender is under lvay for Hispasat lD. The His-
pasat system is compatible with the Syracuse
(France), Skynet (UK) and NATO tV CNATO)
systems.
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(c) NATO
70. The NATO progriunmes (NATO 3D,
NATO 4A, NATO 4B etc.) are being pursued.
C. Positioning satellites
1. The issues
71. The creation of a European satellite posi-
tioning system would give Europe a systun that
rvould be both technically and politically reliable.
72. From the technical point of view there is a
risk with the American GPS system, as under-
lined in Mr Atkinson's report on the millennium
bug8: "according to the experts ten types of dif-
ferent problem have been identified in the GPS
computer programme and (...) in the case of
some of them, it rvill not be possible to pinpoint
them in more detail until three months before the
Year 2000".
73. From the political point of view, in spite of
the decision to abandon dual precision, the sys-
tem remains under the control of the United
States and is therefore at the mercy of unilateral
decisions (amming) in the event of an interna-
tional crisis, although such an eventuality is un-
likely these days because of the implications
(navigation in the civil aviation sector now relies
on the GPS system).
74. In economic terms Europe could, by ac-
quiring a system to compete with GPS, partici-
pate fully in the positioning-related industry. In-
deed, satellite positioning is a generic technology
which, increasingly, is being incorporated into all
kinds of systems (vehicle navigation, tourist in-
formation systems etc.) There are numerous out-
lets for the GPS technology, both in the civil and
military spheres. An estimated nine out of ten
positioning systems (GPS or GLONASS) are
sold for civil or commercial purposes. And this is
just the beginning- because the price of receivers
continues to fall and the variety of possible ap-
plications is growing all the time.
75. Under no circumstances lvould it be
enough for a European system to be used merely
:N a means of checking the integrity of GPS data.
Europe needs its olvn system in order to be pres-
ent on the emerging satellite positioning markets.
-R.s"rrbty 
Document 1622, s November 199E.
2. Globul Navigdion Sdellire System programmes
76. The GNSS programmes are managed by
the European Tripartite Group composed of
Eurocontrol (European Organisation for the
Safety of Air Navigation). the European Space
Agency (ESA) and the European Commission.
The Commission has given strong impetus to the
development of the GNSS programmes.
77. GNSS-I or EGNOS (European Geosta-
tionary Overlay Service) groups together the first
generation of European positioning satellites. The
aim of EGNOS is to enhance the performance of
the GPS and GLONASS satellites by guarantee-
ing their integrity and improving their precision.
Thus, like the American (Wide Area Augmenta-
tion System 
- 
WAAS) and Japanese (Multi-
Function Transport Satellite 
- 
MTSAT) pro-
grrunmes being developed for the north Ameri-
can, Pacific and east Asian zones, EGNOS will
provide corrections for its users in Europe. Eight
European countries have signed an agreement on
the development of the EGNOS system, which
will become operational lr;,2002.
78. GNSS-2 or Galileo will be a full position-
ing system which will work in parallel and be
interoperable with the American GPS and Rus-
sian GLONASS systems. To enhance its reli-
ability, the system will be composed both of
satellites in middle earth orbit (MEO: at an alti-
tude of about 1300 km) and of geostationary
satellites. The Russian experience gathered
through the GLONASS constellation has pro-
vided valuable input for the development of
Galileo. The development prografirme should
begin in autumn 1999 and the constellation
should be operational by 2008. The global cost
of Galileo is estimated at€2.5 to 3 billion.
V Conclusions
79. No truly multilateral European observa-
tion programme appears to be under development
for the momsnt. Yet numerous progranrmes are
candidates for cooperation, in order to reduce the
burden of their costs (Helios-2, SkyMed/COSMO
etc.).
80. In parallel, the industrial mergers currently
under lvay will inevitably lead European gov-
ernments towards more cooperation. They rvill
move alvay from a system of national preference
towards one which favours the emerging Euro-
pean industrial pole- Soon, in the satellite field,
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protection of national industries will no longer be
the order of the day, since the major industrial
players in Europe will be pooling their expertise
in order to remain competitive vis-i-vis their
American counterparts.
81. The main problem confronting us today is
not the same as a decade ago, lrhich proves that
attitudes have changed. These days- in Europe.
the need to develop observation satellites is taken
for granted. France, Italy and Spain, as well as
Germany and the United Kingdom, have recog-
nised the importance of the satellite sector if
Europe is to acquire any degree ofstrategic inde-
pendence. However, opinions diverge as regards
the policy to be followed for the development of
satellites in Europe, and it is here that we must
work to nrurorv the differences. The shortage of
funds for the development of exclusively military
satellites in Europe (shrinking defence budgets)
has prompted some partners to consider develop-
ing satellite systems lvhich can also be used for
commercial applications (sale of images or ofl
the-shelf satellites). If satellites can be produced
in series, the costs go down. This solution would
be advantageous to Europe's defence industry,
since there would be a guaranteed return on in-
vestments lvithout it being necessary to increase
defence budgets. Not all states are lvilling to
adopt such a solution (problems of the prolifera-
tion of satellite capabilities, of the means to
digitalise terrain). Moreover there are political
differences as regards the use which should be
made of any satellites that are built (the issues at
stake are industrial and commercial and/or stra-
tegic). European states are, however, keen to take
up the challenge launched by the United States.
82. Whatever the case may be, the choice of
programme for WEU participation will most
certainly have an impact on the development of
the other programmes. Most of the observation
programmes presented in this report are in need
of funding. It lvill not be possible to develop all
of them. The role of WEU is to rally the support
of its members for a mixed (radar and optical)
constellation. This would enable each participant
to receive images quickly (several satellites and
the ring concept which enables data to be
transmitted from one satellite to another and
down to the ground station). The availability of
several satellites means a greater number of op-
portunities for acquiring images. Finally, qualit-v
and diversity of data are assured by the system of
a mixed 
- 
radar and optical 
- 
constellation. From
an industrial point of view, a mixed constellation
allolvs each country to participate according to
its particular field of expertise. There must be no
duplication rvithin Europe.
83. WEU rvill focus investments on the pro-
grarnme in which it decides to participate. A pro-
grarnme which draws on the particular expertise
of each country would be the best possible solu-
tion. Each of the participants would reap the
benefits of such a multilateral programme in
terms of the return it lvould gain on its industrial,
political and strategic investments. For coopera-
tion to be fruitful, it must be to the advantage of
each participant.
l5
DOCUMENT 16-T3 APPENDICES
APPENDIX I
The WEU Satellite Centre: missions and mode of operation
Missions
The Satellite Centre's mission is to analyse imagery derivedfrom observafion satellites for serurity
and defence purposes.
The imagery is acquired to anslver questions put by the WEU Council, the WEU member states, its
associate members and any other user designated by the Council.
The areas of opplication include:
. General security surveillance:
general security surveillance of areas of interest for WEU on the basis of a mandate of the
Council defining the conditions ofthe surveillance mission;
support for treaty verification;
support of arms control and a proliferation control;
. Support for "Petersberg" type missionsl;
. Surveillance in more specific spheres:
maritime surveillance;
environmental monitoring.
The Centre has been given two other missions:
to train specialists in the interpretation of digital imagery;
to develop new techniques and procedures which will put the Centre on a more effective
operational footing.
Once a question has been raised. the reply takes the form o/4 "dossier".
This document contains the space imagery and maps used for the mission and above all maps with
information and notes provided by the image interpreter, together with his analyticol report.
The complete dossier is sent not only to the requesting body but also to the WEU Headquarters and each
of the thirteen member and associate member states.
I h lgl2, the WEU Council of Ministers meeting at Petersberg near Bonn, envisaged the use of military units,
acting under the authority of WEU, for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and crisis-management
tasks, including peacemaking operations.
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How does the Satellite Cente work?
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APPENDX TI
Presentation of the EUCOSAT report on
"The end of Europeon satellite-based earth observation?"
by Mr lean-Pierre Fourrd, Chairman of EUCOSAT,
former Wce-President of the French Notional Assembly and also of the Assembly of WEU
Power resides in the control of information ...
If the place a state, or collection of states, has been able to claim on the international stage has
traditionally been conditioned directly by the concept of power, this concept is today undergoing a
perceptible evolution in its basic elements. To consider it as a triangle uniting the capacity for
innovation, the economic dimension and a proven lcnowledge of one's environmenl. it must be accepted
that the latter has begun to take on a mojor, if not prominent dimension in this concept qf power.
So, whilst the history of man's conquests up to the present has shown us a continual desire to aspire
to the first two vectors. which can be evaluated quantitatively, new conquests, of a more qualitative less
visual content, crystallise around the control of information, whatever its nature or destination. In
effect, this control- as much through its ability to command a reaction in purely tactical terms as
through its ability to influence decisions of a strategic nature, shows itself to be the indicator of what
today is regarded as the ultimate stage of power, namely the pure and simple domination of culnre and
thought.
... which finds in sotellite-based Earth observation, a special tool ...
In this perspective, it is widely acknowledged that satellite technologt places itself as the main
vector in the acquisition of this dimension, both as a source (remote sensing, navigation,
meteorology...) and as a relay of this source (communications). Satellite technology allows this
dimension to address a series of applications, either of a governmental or commercial nature. even if a
number of them are still in a state of evolution.
lndeed. the technologt of satellite-based Earth observation has proved to be the key element of all
in sittt information systems, even if today exploiting the information still comes up against the
operational limitations of the systems.
... a'en if this tool must still reinforce its operationol capacity and reach its economic maturity.
These limitations or obstructions are mostly due to the infancy of a sector lvhich is today entering a
nelv phase- characterised by a series of major changes which lvill have an influence in the long term.
They appear to be especially frustratrng for the main users of the different fields of application r,vho are
starting to be aware of the arnazng capabilities of spatial remote sensing. Added to this there is a
structural deficit in coordinafion between the dffirent exisfing international systems, resulting from
specialised development and exploitation throughout the entire process of the development of
information. The direct consequence is that the final offer is not very attractive to potential users. This
is particularly evident for sectors as important as, for instance, Geographic lnformation Systems (GIS),
pollution control or even applications linked to precision farmmg.
However, the intrinsic capabilities of the technology, those associated with new factors of growh in
the sector, allorv a glimpse of vety promising medium-term perspecfives of development. The
economics corresponding to the whole of the sector's activities will have nothing in common with the
situation of the last few years, and will settle at a global volume of USS 30.t0 billion (over the next ten
years).
Whilst reference is often only made to the sale of images (which represents just 5% of the total
economic value), it must be noted that the economic stakes are situated further downstream, at the level
of information handling and diffirsion services (50% of the global volume).
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The United States are engaged in a course of actiott simed st the dominotion of the vorld marhet
for information which ...
In this context the United States, conscious of their role of super-power, rvith no real countenveight
at an international level, and desirous of setting-up a real policy of planetary surveillance through the
concept of 'Global Information Dominance' have rapidly identified, through strategic and economic
potentialities of satellite-based Earth observation, the privileged vector for the establishment of their
desire to conquer the world market for informatictn.
They have therefore. during the last felv years, engaged in an unprecedented effort of restructuring of
the sector, particularly stressing the civilian/military synerg/. They have understood the importance of
this dualiryt; more specifically that:
- 
the source of the information is relatively unimportant provided that one has the information itself
and that it should be controlled and validated:
- 
the richness of the information and the speed of its deliverl' to the final user must prevail over the
old traditions of self-sufficiency and secrecy;
- 
civilian systems, for functions lvhich are not specifically military, should be usable at the least
cost.
This ner,v policl'encourages, therefore, the commercial development of high-resolution satellites and
the sale of remote-sensing technology; in order to improve US industrial competitiveness whilst
protecting national security and foreign policv interests.
... through the "National Imagery and Mapping Agency" ...
Holvever- this concept of "Global Information Dominance" could not be carried out efficiently
without the setting up of a unified stnrcture. This structure must be capable of optimising existing
capacities to satisfii the needs of all the users, to exploit to the maximum the nelv digital technologies
and to coordinate activity in the field of data-merging and of exploitation of geo-spatial information, in
order for it to become a truly operational tool.
Thus- the creation at the end of 1996 of the new US imagerv agenc-y: The National Imagery and
Mapping Agencl' (NIMA) must be seen as one of the most important elements in the field of imagery
handling and utilisation 
- 
therefore of information.
A closer examination of this organisation leads us to consider it as a real player- not only in charge
of a national protection mission but also to stimulate nerv behaviour in the organisation of image flows.
The way it is conceived NIMA appears to be a pctlitical tctol which is all the more fficient hecause it
is 
.fimdamentally open and integrating. This concept of integration appropriately describes a
mechanism which is both outward-facing and capable of satisfuing all demands, taking account of the
considerable means of handling and distribution a its disposal.
In line rvith its more industrial-economic approach, NIMA is also tasked with working alongside or
even galvanising the development of industrial initiative.s. This policy of support extends equally to the
producers of data management computer and softr,vare tools in an attempt to harmonise procedures and
technical standards, even if care is regularly taken to challenge any amalgamation- lvith the idea of
'preferential state-controlled client', allowing the funding of private companies...
Furthermore, beyond its effective results as coordinating institution of the American effort, there is
no doubt that the capability of NIMA to stnrcture, even to creale the market for geo-spatial
information will not be without consequence; not only with regard to national or foreign suppliers of
images collectively, but also with regard to inter-State relqtions in the field of the control of this
information This development has the effect of giving the initiative to the US to propose the regulation
that is needed in the international data market, and to allow them to have their approach accepted in the
fight against proliferation. Following on from this analysis- the importance of NIMA for the American
political authorities rests, perhaps, less in its short-term role of unifier but more in its capacity, less
l9
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directly obvious, to be the vector of new modes of regulating the iole of satellite imagery in the
international strategic arena.
Of course, such fundamental changes will certainly not be without consequence for the future of the
other players, governmental and commercial, already present in this sector.
... allotrting them to tahe a dominant position over Europe ...
Based on this initiative- lvhich some would describe as well considered, the US are taking the lead in
a field where, up to now, they did not have the dominant position. Thus. i/ is Europe's place, and that
of its partners on the international stage which is directly compromised. This is true not only
regarding its own control of information but also vis-ir-vis an entire sector of important economic
activity with a more than promising potential.
Faced with the not inconsiderable size of these stakes, it would appear vital to take a decisive step, at
the very least to attempt to preserve a hard-won position or event to retake the lead.
Indeed, as it has been possible to observe in other fields with similar factors (radio broadcasting...),
the risk of delay, which is virtually irreversible, or even the risk of a complete exclusion from the field,
is very real. This is even more worrying tvhen one considers that Europe now has wailable, at its own
level or through its members, the collective technical means (from the space segment to the softivare
which makes the information available to the final user) to allow such a step, by its very nahffe, a
uniEtely political one.
... unless Europe decides to make a bold and rapid reply.
Given the considerable size of the stakes, as well as that of the means of intervention, Europe
collectively and, through it, the constituent European institutions, should really take up this issue as
quickly as possible in order that a rapid and bold initiative can be materialised.
This report- result of work started at the time of the creation of EUCOSAT in 1991, and in line with
the parliamentary initiative of the WEU. is the product oftwo years of preparatory meetings among the
principal institutional and industrial European players in the field of satellite-based Earth observation. It
has allorved the Committee of Ministers to reach the decision aiming for the creation of the Torrej6n
Centre for Interpretation.
It proposes the response which seems today the best way of dealing with the major issues of this
new conquest of information. This response, which is above all pragmatic and concerned with the
respective interests of each player in the field, should soon become reality with the setting up of the
'European Space based lnformation Organisation' (ESIO).
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